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Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have proliferated over the past 50 years such that the 
number of pairs of countries with BITs is roughly as large as the number of country-pairs that 
belong to bilateral or regional preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The purpose of this study 
is to provide the first systematic empirical analysis of the economic determinants of BITs and 
of the likelihood of BITs between pairs of countries using a qualitative choice model, and in a 
manner consistent with explaining PTAs. We develop the econometric specification for 
explaining the two based upon a general equilibrium model of world trade and foreign direct 
investment with three factors, two products, and explicit natural as well as policy trade and 
investment costs among multiple countries in the presence of national and multinational 
firms. The empirical model for BITs and PTAs is bivariate in nature and supports a set of 
hypotheses drawn from the general equilibrium model. Using the preferred empirical model, 
we correctly predict approximately 85 (75) percent of all BITs (PTAs) correctly, relative to an 
unconditional probability of only 11 (16) percent. 
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July 6, 2011 1 Introduction
“[T]he primary problem for researchers wishing to assess the impacts
of policies to promote FDI is that policy adoption is endogenously
determined.” (Aisbett, 2009, p. 396)
“The literature on BITs is limited, making it diﬃcult to truly understand
the determinants for signing.” (Tobin and Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 15)
One of the most notable economic events since World War II is the proliferation of preferential
trade agreements (PTAs), including predominantly free trade agreements (FTAs) and some customs
unions (CUs). However, the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) has been at least as
signiﬁcant as that of PTAs. For instance, in 2010 the U.S. government had 40 BITs in force while it
had only 17 PTAs in force. Figure 1 presents the numbers of BITs in existence in the world in every
year from 1980-2007. Moreover, Table 1 indicates the numbers of country-pairs with BITs and with
PTAs (including some with both) in year 2000 for 161 countries. Table 1 conﬁrms for this sample
923 country-pairs with BITs but not PTAs, 1,478 pairs with PTAs but not BITs, and 556 pairs with
both.1
Yet in contrast to the vast international trade literatures on the theoretical net beneﬁts and costs of
FTAs and CUs and on the empirically-estimated eﬀects of FTAs and CUs on trade ﬂows, the literature
on BITs is not only considerably smaller but dominated by legal scholars. Moreover, the number of
studies of the eﬀects of BITs on foreign direct investment (FDI) ﬂows is limited to a handful relative
to the trade literature for PTAs (including notably gravity-equation studies). Furthermore, there is
no study trying to systematically explain empirically the economic determinants of BITs – much less
one motivated by a general equilibrium model.2 This paper addresses this shortcoming.
We oﬀer three potential contributions. First, building upon the theoretical and empirical literatures
on economic determinants of PTAs (cf., Baier and Bergstrand, 2004), we use comparative statics from
a more general version of the general equilibrium (GE) model of world trade and FDI with national
and multinational ﬁrms with three factors of productions, two goods, three countries, and natural
and policy-based investment and trade costs in Bergstrand and Egger (2007) to illustrate the likely
1We note that, since 1990, many of PTAs have introduced substantive investment provisions; such agreements are
more accurately “preferential trade and investment agreements” (or PTIAs). We will discuss the sensitivity of our main
empirical results to this issue later in the robustness analysis.
2The only empirical study close to ours is Swenson (2005), who provides an econometric analysis explains the number
of BITs across countries in terms of per capita incomes, expropriation risk, and pre-existing levels of FDI stocks. However,
the study is not motivated by a formal economic model and does not address the economic determinants emphasized in
our study.
2net utility gains (losses) of BITs and PTAs between country-pairs as functions of numerous economic
variables. We show how such potential utility gains from BITs and PTAs are functions of economic
(GDP) size, economic similarity, and (natural and policy-based) investment and trade costs – in a
world with identical relative factor endowments. Second, we relax the assumption of identical relative
factor endowments and show the relationships between net utility gains from BITs and PTAs and
relative skilled labor, unskilled labor, and physical capital endowments, using a traditional Edgeworth
box framework, since the vast bulk of BITS are between developed and developing countries. Third,
guided by the comparative statics from the GE model, we specify and estimate a bivariate probit model
of the likelihood of BITs and PTAs between country pairs – a bivariate version of the simple univariate
probit model in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) for predicting PTAs. We ﬁnd that the model has a
pseudo-R2 of 21 percent and predicts correctly approximately 66 percent of all cases (true positives
and true negatives). Speciﬁcally, the model correctly predicts 85 percent of the 1,479 BITs in year
2000 among 12,880 pairs of 161 countries and 62 percent of the remaining 11,401 pairs with no BITS
as well as 75 percent of the 2,034 PTAs in year 2000 among the 12,880 country-pairs and 67 percent
of the remaining 10,846 pairs with no PTAs; we also discuss predicted probabilities at alternative
cutoﬀs. Moreover, we show that the results hold up to an extensive sensitivity analysis, including
simultaneity between BITs and PTAs. These results suggest that the determinants of BITs are –
like those for PTAs – quantiﬁable, and this provides potentially useful information for addressing the
issue of endogeneity in analysis of the eﬀects of BITs and PTAs on FDI and trade ﬂows, as mentioned
above.
2 Motivating Economic Determinants of BITs
The international trade literature has long studied the net beneﬁts and losses from preferential trade
agreements (PTAs), especially CUs and FTAs, beginning with Viner (1950) and Lipsey (1960).3 The
study of PTAs has followed fundamentally two paths, one normative and one positive. The normative
path is whether or not PTAs are welfare-improving; a full discussion of this literature is beyond
the scope of this paper, but see Baldwin (2007) and Freund and Ornelas (2009) for excellent recent
surveys. The second path, which is “positive,” examines what factors explain and predict which pairs
of countries have formed PTAs. Building on the work of Krugman (1991a, 1991b) and Frankel (1997),
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) introduced asymmetric absolute and relative factor endowments into
a Krugman-Heckscher-Ohlin-type increasing-returns/monopolistic-competition model with national
3There is also a more recent large literature on the net gains and losses from currency unions, which is outside the
scope of this study.
3exporting ﬁrms in two industries to show theoretically the net utility gains from, and consequently
empirical likelihood of, a bilateral PTA depend on two countries’ economic size and similarity, distance,
remoteness, and relative factor endowments. Egger and Larch (2008) extended this work to show
empirically how PTAs of “third-country-pairs” aﬀected subsequent PTA formations.
However, the economic literature on BITs is considerably smaller, with surprisingly few contribu-
tions from economists. First, unlike the literature on PTAs, discussions of the potential beneﬁts from
BITs are dominated by legal and political science scholars rather than economists, cf., Salacuse (1990),
Vandevelde (1998, 2000), Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005), and Buthe and Milner (2009).4 Conse-
quently, none of these papers addresses factors explaining BITs’ formations using formal theoretical
economic models, and few provide econometric empirical analyses (cf., Swenson, 2005, as an excep-
tion). Second, relative to the trade and PTA literature, there are few papers – some by economists and
some by legal/political scholars – that have looked systematically and econometrically at the impact
of BITs on FDI. Hallward-Driemier (2003), Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005), Gallagher and Birch
(2006), and Aisbett (2009) ﬁnd little economically and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of BITs on FDI
ﬂows. By contrast, Egger and Pfaﬀermayr (2004a), Salacuse and Sullivan (2005), Neumayer and Spess
(2005), and Buthe and Milner (2009) ﬁnd economically and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects.5
In this paper, we examine formally, theoretically and econometrically, the economic determinants
of BITs – and in a manner consistent with understanding the economic determinants of PTAs. While
BITs have been examined much less in the international economics literature, the motivation for
such agreements for FDI is actually quite analogous to that for PTAs for trade. While ”Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation” treaties surfaced as early as the 18th century, BITs were eﬀectively created
in the 1970s in response to numerous expropriations of FDIs as well as the limitation of the General
Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) to trade only; (West) Germany concluded the ﬁrst BIT.
Hence, the ﬁrst BITs were intended to reduce the relative cost of FDI, such as PTAs reduce the
relative cost of trade.6
More recently, BITs regulate FDI-related issues such as admission, treatment, expropriation, and
the settlement of disputes at the bilateral level. They establish transparency about investment risk, and
consequently reduce ex ante the risks of FDI by a home country. BITs ensure that ﬁrms have property
4An exceptional edited volume of recent studies on the eﬀect of BITs (and double taxation treaties) on FDI, including
many of the papers noted in this paragraph, is Sauvant and Sachs (2009).
5Moreover, only one paper – Aisbett (2009) – provides a formal game-theoretic model of BITs formation based upon
expropriation risk. We refer to this model later for motivating the inclusion of a measure of expropriation risk in our
empirical analysis. However, the model does not address how factors such as economic size and similarity, trade and
investment costs, and relative factor endowments can help explain the likelihood of a BIT between a country-pair.
6The importance of FDI has also led many PTAs to be broadened to include FDI provisions, such as in NAFTA.
However, the number of preferential trade and investment agreements (PTIAs) still are fewer than 10 percent of the
number of BITs (cf., Sauvant and Sachs, 2009) and this issue will be discussed later.
4rights and they are protected from expropriation. According to the Oﬃce of Investment Aﬀairs of
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Business Aﬀairs, BITs should: (1) protect U.S. FDI stocks where
U.S. investors’ rights are not protected already via existing agreements; (2) encourage host countries
to adopt market-oriented domestic policies that treat foreign and domestic investors equivalently;
and (3) support the development of international law standards. UNCTAD (1998) summarizes the
following characteristics of many existing BITs. First, most BITS facilitate FDI by guaranteeing
foreign investors fair and equitable, non-discriminatory, most-favored-nation and national treatment.
Second, most BITS provide legal protection of physical and intellectual properties under international
law. Third, some BITS even provide more transparent conditions for foreign investors than for their
national counterparts.
Since the fundamental purpose now of a BIT is to encourage FDI ﬂows between country pairs by
reducing the relative cost of FDI and that of a PTA is to encourage trade between country pairs by
reducing the relative cost of trade, economic determinants of BITs may well share many similarities
to those of PTAs. Since there has been no previous formal theoretical nor econometric model of the
determinants of BITs, our starting point is the new literature on the economic determinants of PTAs.
This literature, surveyed in Freund and Ornelas (2009), starts with Baier and Bergstrand (2004),
which developed a qualitative choice econometric model of the likelihood of a pair of countries having
a PTA in a given year.7 Motivated by a general equilibrium model of world trade with two factors, two
monopolistically-competitive markets with national exporting ﬁrms, and explicit intercontinental and
intracontinental trade costs among multiple countries on multiple continents, the Baier-Bergstrand
model suggests that country-pairs are more likely to have a PTA: (1) the closer together they are; (2)
the more remote they are from other markets; (3) the larger their joint economic size; (4) the more
similar their economic sizes; (5) the larger the diﬀerence in the pairs’ relative factor endowments (up to
a point). Baier and Bergstrand (2004) showed that all these economic factors were economically and
statistically signiﬁcant (with expected signs) in explaining cross-sectional variation in country-pairs’
probabilities of having PTAs with a pseudo-R2 of 73 percent. Moreover, the probit model correctly
predicted 85 percent of the 286 bilateral PTAs existing in 1996 among 1,431 pairs and 97 percent of
the remaining 1,145 pairs with no PTAs. Using a larger sample of 10,585 pairs in year 2000, Egger
and Larch (2008) predicted correctly about 1,000 of the 1,498 pairs with PTAs (or 67 percent) and
9,131 of the 9,322 pairs with no PTAs (or 98 percent). Of course, their pseudo-R2 was considerably
lower at 27 percent (as expected) due to their much larger and less selective sample.
7Recent extensions of the model include, for example, Egger and Larch (2008) and Baldwin and Jaimovich (2010),
who examined the role of PTAs of “third-countries” for explaining subsequent PTA formations and enlargements, and
Bergstrand, Egger and Larch (2010), who examined the role of several economic variables for the “timing” of PTA
formations and enlargements.
5However, the economic determinants of BITs are not likely to be explained by the same econometric
model, due to several considerations. First, BITs potentially inﬂuence FDI ﬂows. Consequently, while
economic size and similarity help to predict PTAs, they may not simultaneously predict BITs; as
mentioned, most BITs are between developed and developing countries (and the latter tend to be
economically smaller than the former). Other factors – such as bilateral trade and investment costs
and relative factor endowments – are likely to have diﬀering eﬀects on explaining BITs relative to
PTAs. Since FDI is generated by multinational enterprises (MNEs), a theoretical framework should
incorporate MNEs’ behavior; consequently, a simple Krugman-Heckscher-Ohlin general equilibrium
(GE) model of trade as in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) is insuﬃcient. An extension of the Baier-
Bergstrand framework to include MNEs, FDI ﬂows, and foreign aﬃliate sales (FAS), in the spirit of
the “Knowledge-Capital” (KC) models of Markusen (2002) and Markusen and Maskus (2001, 2002), is
a natural direction. Fortunately, Bergstrand and Egger (2007) have extended the 2x2x2 KC model to
three factors and three countries, and provide a ready framework to address the economic determinants
of BITs and PTAs, in the spirit of the multi-country model in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) for
just trade ﬂows and PTAs. Bergstrand and Egger (2007) is especially relevant because it is the
ﬁrst general equilibrium model to demonstrate that bilateral FDI and trade are maximized between
countries with identical relative and absolute factor endowments, consistent with the large literature on
gravity equations that explain very well both bilateral trade and FDI ﬂows.8 Thus, the ﬁrst potential
contribution of this paper is to use the theoretical framework in Bergstrand and Egger (2007) to
generate comparative statics to show (in the absence of any relative factor endowment diﬀerences)
how: (1) economic size and size similarity of two countries inﬂuence their net utility gains from a
BIT and from a PTA; and (2) bilateral investment and trade costs between two countries inﬂuence
their net utility gains (or losses) from a BIT and from a PTA. Note that, in general equilibrium, the
net utility gains from BITs and PTAs are inﬂuenced by the behavior of multinational enterprises as
well as national (exporting) ﬁrms. In the presence of MNEs and general equilibrium, the inﬂuences
of these economic variables on the net utility gains from a PTA are not necessarily the same as those
found in Baier and Bergstrand (2004), where MNEs and FDI were absent.
Second, in reality relative factor endowments are not identical across countries, and such diﬀer-
ences matter for economic determinants of BITs because many BITs (not to mention PTAs) are
“North-South” in nature, that is, between countries with quite diﬀerent relative factor endowments.
The second potential contribution of this paper is to show the relationship between relative factor
8Blonigen and Piger (2011), using a Bayesian moving average statistical technique, have recently shown that the most
important factors for explaining FDI ﬂows are basic gravity equation variables parent- and host-country real GDPs and
bilateral distance.
6endowments between two countries and the net utility gains from BITs and from PTAs. This goal
is more complicated here because Baier and Bergstrand (2004) had only two factors of production.
With three factors – skilled labor, unskilled labor, and physical capital – the relationships are more
complex. However, using traditional Edgeworth boxes and recent developments in specifying properly
the relationships between relative factor endowments and bilateral FAS ﬂows in Braconier, Norback
and Urban (2005), the theoretical relationships between factor shares suggest easily speciﬁed empirical
counterparts to capture some of the inﬂuences of relative factor endowments on the net utility gains
from BITs and PTAs.9
Third, guided by the theoretical comparative statics, we specify a bivariate probit model of the
probabilities of BITs and PTAs existing between country pairs in year 2000. We choose to estimate
a bivariate probit model because the error terms may be correlated across probabilities, and this
provides more eﬃcient coeﬃcient estimates. To anticipate some of the results, we ﬁnd the following
empirical conclusions. First, as most trade is “intra-industry” and most FDI is “horizontal,” one
would expect that the net utility gains from a BIT and from a PTA are positively related to economic
size and similarity. Such results are conﬁrmed here. Second, our theoretical model suggests that
higher bilateral investment costs should reduce the likelihood of a BIT, but increase the likelihood of a
PTA. Using a measure of investment costs that inﬂuences FDI and trade oppositely, we ﬁnd evidence
of this “substitution eﬀect.” Third, in the presence of three factors of production, the relationships
between relative factor endowments (measured, as a conventional Edgeworth box suggests, using factor
shares) and net utility gains of a pair of countries from a BIT or a PTA are complex, non-linear, and
non-monotonic. However, we draw upon the geometric features of an Edgeworth box to introduce
a measure of similarity of factor shares that helps explain the importance of relative abundance of
skilled labor in the home country for increasing the net utility gains from a BIT for a country-pair.
Alongside another (more standard) measure of deviations of capital-unskilled-labor ratios from the
Edgeworth box diagonal, we show empirically how relative factor endowments aﬀect the probabilities
of a BIT and of a PTA. Finally, the bivariate empirical model has a relatively high explanatory
power that holds up to an extensive sensitivity analysis. Moreover, the inclusion of diﬀerent relative
factor endowment variables for the BIT and PTA equations allows for potential identiﬁcation in a
simultaneous equations system, which we explore. Finally, we correctly predict 85 percent of the 1,479
BITs in year 2000 among 12,880 pairs of countries and 62 percent of the remaining 11,401 pairs with
no BITS as well as 75 percent of the 2,034 PTAs in year 2000 among the 12,880 country-pairs and
9Blonigen and Piger (2011) show that – beyond parent- and host-country real GDPs and bilateral distance – the most
important variables explaining FDI ﬂows are parent real GDP per capita, parent physical capital per worker, relative
skilled-labor endowments, common oﬃcial language, urban concentration of the host country, and remoteness of the host
country from ROW.
767 percent of the remaining 10,846 pairs with no PTAs. The overall pseudo-R2 of 21 percent for our
bivariate probit model is only slightly less than the 27 percent found in Egger and Larch (2008) for
PTAs using a univariate probit model and a comparable sample. The results provide quantitative
guidance as to the determinants of BITs and PTAs simultaneously and to addressing potentially the
endogeneity bias inherent in many previous empirical analyses of the eﬀects of BITs on FDI ﬂows.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 3, we summarize the theoretical GE model
of Bergstrand and Egger (2007) and the parameter values chosen for the numerical version of the GE
model. In section 4, we discuss the GE comparative static results for the relationships between the
net utility gains from a BIT and from a PTA with economic size and similarity, investment costs,
and trade costs, assuming identical relative factor endowments across countries. In section 5, we relax
the assumption of identical relative factor endowments and, using conventional Edgeworth boxes and
their geometric properties, provide GE comparative statics to motivate two relative-factor-endowment
variables for the empirical analysis. In section 6, we describe our data set and provide the results from
the bivariate probit empirical analysis, including the robustness analysis. Section 7 concludes.
3 Theoretical Framework: A Summary of the Bergstrand and Egger
(2007) Knowledge-Capital-and-FDI Model
The model we use is a more general version of the 3-country, 3-factor, 2-good model in Bergstrand and
Egger (2007) by allowing for BITs and for diﬀerences in relative skilled-to-unskilled-labor (S/U) ratios
and relative physical-capital-to-unskilled-labor (K/U) ratios, the latter consequently generating hori-
zontal and vertical MNEs as well as national exporting enterprises (NEs) in equilibrium. Bergstrand
and Egger (2007) is a 3-factor, 3-country extension of the 2x2x2 KC model in Markusen (2002) with
national exporters (NEs), horizontal MNEs (HMNEs), and vertical MNEs (VMNEs).10 However,
Bergstrand and Egger (2007) assumed identical relative factor endowments to focus on the roles of
economic size and similarity and provide a theoretical foundation for gravity equations of bilateral
trade, FDI, and foreign aﬃliate sales (FAS) simultaneously; consequently, no VMNEs surfaced in that
paper, except in one sensitivity analysis. VMNEs play a role here alongside HMNEs, due to diﬀerences
between countries in S/U and K/U ratios.
Although the theoretical model is used only to suggest testable hypotheses, it is important to
note that the determinants of BITs are likely strongly related to the determinants of FDI ﬂows (as
10Since the explicit equations are provided in Bergstrand and Egger (2007), there is no need to repeat them here in
the text; we provide them in a Theoretical Appendix later, which is not intended for publication. To limit the scope of
this already complex model, we assume (ﬁrm) homogeneity among NEs, among HMNEs, and among VMNEs, although
there is heterogeneity between these three ﬁrm types.
8Baier and Bergstrand (2004) found that determinants of PTAs were similar to determinants of trade
ﬂows). Recently, Blonigen and Piger (2011) showed using a Bayesian moving average econometric
analysis that the most important factors inﬂuencing FDI ﬂows are parent- and host-countries’ real
GDPs, bilateral distance, parent real GDP per capita, parent capital per worker, relative skilled-labor
endowments, common oﬃcial language, remoteness of host country, and urban concentration of the
host country. With the exception of host country urban concentration, all of these economic variables
are embedded in the Bergstrand and Egger (2007) model. Moreover, Bergstrand and Egger (2011)
provide empirical support as well for the economic and statistical importance of these variables (except
host urban concentration).
We now summarize the theoretical model underlying our hypotheses. The demand side in the
model is analogous to that in the KC model. However, the model of Bergstrand and Egger (2007)
extends the KC model in two important ways. The ﬁrst distinction is the addition of “FDI” and
physical capital to the KC model, where the latter focuses only on “knowledge capital” and skilled
labor (alongside unskilled labor). A key notion of the 2-factor KC model is that both skilled and
unskilled labor are internationally immobile; however, skilled labor possesses (“non-rival”) knowledge
capital for which its services can be shared costlessly by an MNE at home and abroad. Knowledge
capital represents the intangible assets of ﬁrms, the services of which – because of their “public good”
nature within the ﬁrm – can be used globally within the ﬁrm without “rivalry” and can ﬂow relatively
costlessly between countries, cf. Markusen (2002).
However, there is no factor in the KC model to represent the tangible assets of ﬁrms; hence, physical
capital has been omitted from the KC model even though Blonigen and Piger (2011) show that it is
important empirically. Tangible assets are represented by the (ﬁnancial) claims of the ﬁrm on private
capital and are distinguished from knowledge capital because of their “rival” (“private good”) nature
within the ﬁrm and the services can ﬂow imperfectly across countries due to FDI impediments. In
reality, of course, national and multinational ﬁrms use both (rival) private capital – often measured
by the ﬁnancial claims to tangible assets such as physical capital at home or abroad – as well as
(non-rival) knowledge capital – often associated with skilled labor. Moreover, physical capital and
skilled labor tend to be complements in production, cf., Slaughter (2000).
Thus, the key diﬀerence between our model and Markusen’s KC model is that we add a third factor,
private physical capital (K), the services of which can be used at home or transferred abroad (via
FDI, and not necessarily costlessly) either as a “greenﬁeld” investment or an acquisition.11 We assume
11Hence, in the KC model, skilled labor is immobile internationally, but the services of (non-rival) “knowledge capital”
are (costlessly) mobile. In our model, this still holds, but additionally physical capital is immobile internationally, but
the services of (rival) “ﬁnancial capital” are internationally mobile (with possible investment costs) for plant setups. Our
model is static with no depreciation; the real world is dynamic and depreciation occurs. In reality in a typical year (with
9that all three internationally-immobile primary factors are used in the production of the diﬀerentiated
good: unskilled labor (U), skilled labor (S), and private physical capital (K). Moreover, following
evidence from Griliches (1969), Goldin and Katz (1998), and Slaughter (2000), we assume that skilled
labor and physical capital are complements in production, which is also consistent with evidence in
Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2005) that MNEs tend to be relatively abundant in countries that are
relatively abundant in both skilled labor and physical capital. However, for the setups of headquarters
and plants, we assume that only the services of skilled labor (physical capital) are used to setup
headquarters (plants). HMNEs headquartered in any country i, for example, arise endogenously, and
the services of home physical capital are “used up” (due to their “rival” nature) to setup a plant in
the home country and abroad to maximize ﬁrm proﬁts (with an implied no-arbitrage incentive for
rates of return on physical capital; no proﬁts are left “on the table”), but physical capital need not
actually move internationally. In the presence of imperfect international (ﬁnancial) capital mobility,
ﬁrms may choose to have ﬁnancial claims to physical capital at home or – via FDI – abroad; the key
distinction from knowledge capital is that claims to physical capital are rival, and FDI – due to foreign
government restrictions – may not move costlessly between countries.12
The second distinction of our model from the KC model is to introduce a “third country,” or Rest-
of-World (ROW). The presence of the third country helps explain the observed complementarity of
bilateral FAS and trade ﬂows with respect to a country pair’s economic size and similarity and that
bilateral FDI and FAS tend empirically to be as well explained by a gravity equation as bilateral trade
ﬂows are. One implication of a third country is that (in equilibrium) both two-country HMNEs and
three-country HMNEs may surface. It is unclear what the implications of the typical “two-country”
assumption in the KC model are when guiding empirical work in an N-country world.
As noted, vertical MNEs played no role in explaining FAS and trade patterns in Bergstrand and
Egger (2007), except in one sensitivity analysis. By contrast, VMNEs play a central role here. We
growth), MNEs choose (based upon ﬁrm proﬁt maximization) to allocate a portion of real ﬁxed investment expenditures to
the domestic market and portions to one or more foreign markets (either as greenﬁeld investment or mergers-acquisition;
our model generalizes to both); this deﬁnition of FDI is captured in the “current-cost” method (of “investment in plant
and equipment”), cf., Borga and Yorgason (2002). In oﬃcial statistics, FDI outﬂows are also (market-value) measured
as infusions of equity capital and reinvestment of retained earnings into aﬃliates (and acquisitions). Economically, an
FDI outﬂow reduces a parent’s equity claims on tangible assets in the home country and increases the parent’s claims
on tangible assets in the country where the foreign aﬃliate (or acquisition) exists (hence, the “rival” nature of FDI).
Conceptually, the Bergstrand and Egger (2007) model is consistent with such classic papers as Caves (1971), Markusen
(1983), Helpman and Razin (1983), and Neary (1995) as well as with recent MNE models such as Muendler and Becker
(2011). The numeraire homogeneous good will be produced using only unskilled labor.
12Physical capital (K) in our model can just as easily be interpreted as ﬁnancial equity claims on any tangible assets
(other than knowledge). The key issue for our model is that there is another factor (K) that complements skilled labor
(S) in production and that (rival) K is “used up” in the ﬁxed costs of setting up a plant at home or abroad. One can
also interpret physical capital as “putty” capital, with the fraction of home capital used in domestic production and
the fraction that is used up in setting up plants at home and abroad as endogenously determined by the MNE’s proﬁt
maximization decision.
10distinguish in this paper theoretically and empirically between diﬀerences between two countries’
K=U ratios and diﬀerences between two countries’ S=U ratios. Even though S and K tend to be
complements in production, diﬀerences in the relative factor intensity requirements of setting up
headquarters (needing S) relative to setting up plants (needing K) inﬂuence the results. Since the
structure and calibration of the model is described explicitly in Bergstrand and Egger (2007), to
conserve space we refer the reader to that paper for description of the theoretical model and of the
calibration of its numerical version.
4 Economic Determinants of BITs and PTAs
In this section, we focus on eight theoretical results (summarized in four hypotheses), assuming coun-
tries are identical in relative factor endowments. First, we address the relationship between economic
(GDP) size and similarity for inﬂuencing the net utility gains from BITs and PTAs (four results).
Second, we discuss the relationship between bilateral investment and trade costs for inﬂuencing the
net utility gains from BITs and PTAs (four results).
4.1 Economic Size, Economic Similarity, and Welfare Gains from BITs and PTAs
Using the model described above (and in Appendixes A and B), we simulated the model under alter-
native scenarios. First, we simulated the model with and without a BIT between countries i and j
at various levels of GDP size and similarity for these two countries. In the base model without the
BIT, the ad valorem policy-based FDI barrier (g) was 10 percent; in the scenario with the BIT, this
barrier was zero. Figure 2a presents the results of the utility change for countries i and j from their
forming a BIT, depending upon their joint economic size (y-axis) and their similarity of economic size
(x-axis). The z-axis represents the utility change for both i and j from their forming a BIT (Figure
2a).13 The y-axis is the sum of the GDPs of countries i and j. The lines on the y-axis are indexed
from 1 to 1.7. The y-axis indexes country-pairs’ GDPs from the smallest joint GDP (line 1) to the
largest joint GDP (line 1.7).14 The x-axis is indexed from 0.45 to 0.55. Each line represents i’s share
of both countries’ GDPs, where the center line represents 50 percent, or identical GDP shares for i
and j. Second, we simulated the model with and without a PTA between countries i and j at various
levels of GDP size and similarity for these two countries. In the base model without the PTA, the ad
valorem policy-based tariﬀ rate () was 20 percent; in the scenario with the PTA, the tariﬀ rate was
13We assume the existence of transfers between the two countries’ governments so that the relevant consideration is
the sum of the two countries’ representative consumers’ utilities.
14See Bergstrand and Egger (2007) on determination of relative GDP sizes; the dispersion is based upon empirical
GDP data.
11zero. Figure 2b presents the results of the utility change for countries i and j from their forming a
PTA.
Hypothesis 1: The net utility gain from and likelihood of a BIT and of a PTA between i and j
is a positive function of their joint economic sizes.
The economic rationale is based upon the following intuition. Consider Figure 2a ﬁrst. When i and
j have identical relative factor endowments (as assumed in this section), there are horizontal MNEs
in equilibrium, but no VMNEs (for a large set of parameters), consistent with Bergstrand and Egger
(2007). All FDI (and FAS) is intra-industry. Consequently, when two countries are larger, there will
be a larger volume of horizontal FDI. The formation of a BIT will then reduce bilateral investment
costs on a larger volume of FDI for two larger countries (and associated larger number of varieties
produced and consumed), and consequently increase the utility gains more for both countries relative
to two smaller countries. This increases the probability of a BIT between i and j, for a given ROW
GDP.
The same rationale applies to PTA and economic size, as in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) in the
absence of MNEs, cf., Figure 2b. When i and j have identical relative factor endowments, all bilateral
trade is intra-industry. Consequently, when two countries are larger, there will be a larger volume of
intra-industry trade of NEs (and associated larger number of varieties produced and consumed). The
formation of a PTA will then reduce bilateral trade costs on a larger volume of trade for two larger
countries, and consequently increase the utility gains more for both countries relative to two smaller
countries. This increases the probability of a PTA between i and j, for a given ROW GDP.15
Hypothesis 2: The net utility gain from and likelihood of a BIT and of a PTA between i and j
is a positive function of the similarity in their economic sizes.
The economic rationale is based upon similar intra-industry reasoning. Consider Figure 2a ﬁrst.
We know from the literature on gravity equations that – for a given total economic size – ﬂows between
i and j (either trade or FDI) will be maximized when the two countries have identical sizes. In a
simple frictionless world:
Flowij = GDPiGDPj=GDPW = (GDPi + GDPj)2(shishj)=GDPW (1)
where Flowij denotes either a trade or FDI ﬂow from i to j, GDPW is world GDP, shi denotes i’s
share of countries’ i and j joint GDP, and shj is deﬁned analogously for j. Intuitively, suppose i had all
of the two countries’ (i’s and j’s) GDP. Then there would be no reason for i to setup an aﬃliated plant
15See Bergstrand and Egger (2007) on the theoretical foundation for bilateral trade and FDI ﬂows related positively
to both economic size and similarity.
12in j, and consequently there would be no economic gain from forming a BIT. However, the volume of
FDI from i to j will be maximized when each country has the same economic size. Consequently, the
gains from a BIT will be maximized when the two countries have identical sizes.
A similar economic rationale holds for PTAs and trade, cf., Figure 2b, as addressed in Baier
and Bergstrand (2004) in the absence of MNEs. We note, however, that the theoretical relationship
between similarity and gains from a BIT does not appear as strong as that for a PTA. We leave it to
the empirical analysis to conﬁrm the relative strengths of the two relationships.
4.2 Investment Costs, Trade Costs, and Welfare Gains from BITs and PTAs
Figures 3a and 3b present the results of the utility change for two identical countries (i;j) from
introducing a BIT between i and j and a PTA between i and j, respectively. First, we provide a
brief explanation of the axes for these two ﬁgures. The “vertical” axis (or z-axis) represents the net
utility gain (or, if negative, loss) for countries i and j from introducing either a BIT (cf., Figure 3a)
or a PTA between i and j (cf., Figure 3b). The y-axis is labeled from 1 to 1.13 and represents the
gross bilateral natural trade cost from i to j, ij; =1 implies zero natural trade cost. The x-axis is
labeled from 0.4 to 0.8 and represents a bilateral natural FDI investment cost, ij, such as “political
instability.” A higher value of ij represents a higher natural cost (in ad valorem terms) for an MNE
with a headquarters in i to invest in j.
Although the details of the calibration are presented in Appendix B, recall that initially bilateral
tariﬀs among all countries on goods (bij) are 20 percent and all bilateral “policy” investment costs on
FDI (gij) are 10 percent (the latter are approximately one-ﬁfth of the total foreign investment costs).
The BIT between i and j, or BITij, is captured by a reduction of the policy investment cost between
i and j (g) from 10 percent to zero. The PTA between i and j, or PTAij, is captured by a reduction
of the tariﬀ rate between i and j () from 20 percent to zero, similar to Baier and Bergstrand (2004).
Hypothesis 3: The net utility gains from and likelihood of a BIT between i and j are a negative
function of their natural bilateral investment costs and a positive function of their natural bilateral
trade costs.
A BIT between i and j tends to raise economic welfare of each of the two countries, with the gains
larger the lower are natural bilateral investment costs and the higher are natural bilateral trade costs,
cf., Figure 3a. To understand this, consider ﬁrst the more well-known negative relationship between
the gains to countries i and j of PTAij and “natural” trade costs between i and j in Figure 3b.
Common examples of “natural” bilateral trade costs (from the large trade gravity equation literature)
are the absence of a common land border and absence of a common language (i.e., the absence of these
13commonalities causes a positive trade cost). As shown in Baier and Bergstrand (2004), a low value
of natural trade costs (such as the presence of a common land border) between i and j – other things
the same – implies a high value of bilateral trade. Consequently, a given reduction in the bilateral
tariﬀ rate between i and j will lead to a large increase in bilateral trade and a large gain in utility for
i and j. Hence, larger natural bilateral trade costs reduce the net utility gains from and likelihood of
PTAij, cf., Figure 3b.
Consider now the relationship between the gains for i and j from BITij and natural bilateral
investment costs, shown in Figure 3a. An example of a “natural” bilateral investment cost for FDI
is political instability of the host country government. A higher degree of political instability in host
country j leads to a lower level of bilateral FDI from i to j. Since FDI is lower, the gains to FDIij
from BITij are lower. Hence, the net utility gains from and likelihood of BITij are higher the higher
(lower) the degree of political stability (instability) in j.
Consider now the “cross-price” eﬀect. A higher natural bilateral trade cost between i and j will
tend to reduce bilateral trade between i and j, but increase bilateral FDI between i to j. While
for most country pairs in reality, bilateral FDI ﬂows tend to be large when the countries’ bilateral
trade ﬂows are large as addressed in Bergstrand and Egger (2007), FDI and trade are substitutes with
respect to relative price eﬀects. Thus, a BIT between i and j will liberalize a larger volume of FDI
the higher are the countries’ bilateral trade costs, leading to a larger net utility gain for i and j, and
increasing the likelihood of BITij, cf., Figure 3a. Hence, the net utility gains from and likelihood of
BITij are larger the higher are natural bilateral trade costs.
Hypothesis 4: The net utility gains from and likelihood of a PTA between i and j are a neg-
ative function of their natural bilateral trade costs and a positive function of their natural bilateral
investment costs.
A PTA between i and j tends to raise economic welfare of each of the two countries, with the gains
larger the lower are natural bilateral trade costs and the higher are natural bilateral investment costs,
cf., Figure 3b.16 We described one of these channels above already. A low natural bilateral trade cost,
such as a common language, increases bilateral trade for countries i and j. Thus, a given reduction in
their bilateral tariﬀ rate will lead to a large increase in bilateral trade and a large gain in utility for i
and j, increasing the likelihood of PTAij.
There is a similar cross-price eﬀect for PTAs as well. A higher natural bilateral investment cost
between i and j will tend to reduce bilateral FDI between i and j, but increase bilateral trade
between i and j. Thus, a PTA between i and j will liberalize a larger volume of trade the higher are
natural bilateral investment costs, leading to a larger net utility gain for i and j, and increasing the
16PTAs are assumed here to be trade agreements only, with no FDI provisions.
14likelihood of PTAij, cf., Figure 3b. Hence, the likelihood of PTAij is higher the larger are natural
bilateral investment costs, such as political instability. All four hypotheses will be “tested” later in
the empirical section.
5 Relative Factor Endowments and Determinants of BITS and PTAs
As noted in the BITs literature, most BITs are between developed and developing countries, motivated
initially (in the 1970s) by the risk of expropriation. Consequently, relative factor endowment diﬀerences
may well be inﬂuential in the likelihood of a BIT between a country-pair. We now allow relative factor
endowments to vary between countries and consider the net utility gains (or losses) from either a BIT
or a PTA. For tractability, we use the traditional Edgeworth box to illustrate our results. However,
an Edgeworth box is designed to illustrate the impacts in a world with two countries and two factors.
In our three-factor setting, we are taking a “slice” of an Edgeworth cube for the two countries. For
instance, if we consider two factors, physical capital (K) and unskilled labor (U), there is a continuum
of such slices for the various values of si – the share of i’s and j’s skilled labor (S) in country i. For
illustration below, we will examine the relationship between the utility gains for i and j from BITij
with ki and ui at si = 0:5; similarly, we will examine the relationship between the utility gains for
i and j from PTAij with ki and ui at si = 0:5.17 Also, since we are operating in a three-country
world, we are examining these relationships for a given endowment of factors K;S and U in the ROW.
Of course, the Edgeworth box relationships are quantitatively sensitive to the economic size of and
relative factor endowments in ROW.18
Hypothesis 5: The net utility gain from and likelihood of a BIT between i and j are increasing
in the abundance of skilled labor relative to capital and unskilled labor in i or j.
Figure 4a presents the relationships between the utility gains for i from BITij with ki and ui at
si = 0:5. Figure 4a suggests that the net utility gains for i and j from BITij are maximized when
either i or j has a very small amount of the two countries’ K and U, given si = 0:5 (that is, i or j is
very skilled labor abundant). Intuitively, the beneﬁts of BITij will be greater the larger the FDI/FAS
created by the BIT. FAS will be larger with greater numbers of vertical MNEs (VMNEs) and horizontal
MNEs (HMNEs). VMNEs and HMNEs will be prominent when skilled labor is abundant relative to
capital and to unskilled labor, because such a country would have a comparative advantage in setting
up headquarters (which are S intensive) and a comparative disadvantage in production at home (low
17Empirically, for the data set used later the actual means of si;ui, and ki all range between 0.53 and 0.56, so using
si = 0:5 is a feasible choice.
18In the simulations below, we assume for ROW that its endowments of K;S and U are exactly one-third of the
world’s endowments and that trade and investment costs in the benchmark equilibrium are the same between i and j as
they are between either of these countries and the ROW.
15K and U for plant setups and production). Hence, the beneﬁts from a BIT between i and j should
be maximized when either i or j is abundant in S relative to K and U (note the utility gains are
maximized near the two countries’ origins, and si = sj = 0.19
Hypothesis 6: The net utility gain from and likelihood of a PTA between i and j are decreasing
in diﬀerences of both countries’ ratios of physical capital to unskilled labor.
It is well established that a PTA between a pair of countries should increase trade between them.
However, it may not be the case that the welfare of the country-pair is enhanced from this PTA
– especially if the pair has large diﬀerences in capital-unskilled labor endowment ratios. Baier and
Bergstrand (2004) showed in a world excluding MNEs that the welfare beneﬁts from PTAij were
positive in relative factor endowment diﬀerences, up to a point, based upon traditional comparative
advantage interacted with trade costs.20 While that study’s empirical results supported that result,
Egger and Larch (2008) found in a much larger sample that wider relative capital-unskilled labor
ratios were negatively related to the likelihood of a PTA. The model here can help to explain this
latter result.
Figure 4b illustrates the utility gain to i and j from PTAij. The prominent aspect of this ﬁgure
is that the two countries’ utility gains are decreasing in larger diﬀerences in their K=U ratios. Our
model can explain this, drawing once again on changes in the activities of NEs, HMNEs, and VMNEs.
Note initially that when i and j have identical shares of all three factors, pure intra-industry trade
of NEs will be maximized, cf., Figure 4c (middle of the diagram). With a large amount of bilateral
intra-industry trade, a PTA causes a large increase in trade between them, consistent with net utility
gains at the center of Figure 4b. Moreover, the increase in the volume of trade due to a PTA is also
very large if countries i and j have very diﬀerent K=U ratios (cf., Figure 4c), consistent with a PTA
beneﬁting traditional Heckscher-Ohlin trade, as in Baier and Bergstrand (2004).21
However, in our context with MNEs also, the utility gains on net from PTAij may in fact be a
negative function of relative K=U ratios for i and j because of a large loss of varieties (and consequently
utility) when K=U ratios of i and j are vastly diﬀerent. The number of HMNEs are maximized when
countries i and j are identical. With wider relative K=U ratios, there will be fewer HMNEs in i and
19We can conﬁrm using additional ﬁgures of the numbers of VMNEs and HMNEs headquartered in i and j that both
countries beneﬁt the most from a BIT when i or j is very skilled labor abundant. It is important to note that when ki
and ui are small, kj and uj are large by construction (ki= 1-kj). However, when ki and ui are small, they are small
relative to si (since si=sj=0.5 in Figure 4a), implying that i is relatively abundant in skilled labor, and consequently
has a comparative advantage in setting up an MNE and beneﬁtting from a BIT. Analogously, when kj and uj are small,
they are small relative to sj, implying that j is relatively abundant in skilled labor, and consequently has a comparative
advantage in setting up an MNE and beneﬁtting from a BIT. Thus, the potential gains from a BIT are maximized when
either i or j is abundant in skilled labor relative to physical capital and unskilled labor.
20Baier and Bergstrand (2004) showed a quadratic relationship, both theoretically and empirically.
21Hence, bilateral trade of NEs is very large when countries i and j are identical in absolute and relative factor
endowments (i.e., intra-industry trade) and when the two countries have very diﬀerent K=U ratios (i.e., inter-industry
trade).
16j (and demand will be met more by NEs). The loss in volume of the relatively few varieties produced
by HMNEs with PTAij – see Figure 4d – causes a greater loss of utility for i or j when K=U ratios
are very large than the gain in utility for trading large volumes of the varieties goods produced by
NEs, see Figure 4c.
Moreover, VMNE activity cannot oﬀset these welfare losses. There is little change in the volume
of VMNE activity from PTAij.22 Consequently, the large utility loss from the decline in production
of the few HMNEs in i or j in the presence of large K=U ratio diﬀerences oﬀsets the utility gains from
trading more of NEs’ outputs following a PTA, suggesting that the probability of a PTA between i
and j – in the context of MNEs – may fall the greater the K=U endowment ratio diﬀerences between
the two countries, as stated in Hypothesis 6.
Since the Edgeworth surfaces are handy, we address brieﬂy the method for which we will capture
empirically the inﬂuence of relative K=U ratios of i and j on the likelihood of PTAij, in the context
of our theoretical model. First, as in Braconier, Norback, and Urban (2005), we want the measure
of relative factor endowment diﬀerences to capture as precisely as possible the relationships between
relative factor endowment shares as shown in the ﬁgures. Consequently, the absolute diﬀerence in the
natural logs of ki=ui and kj=uj captures deviations of relative factor endowments from the NW-SE
diagonal in Figure 4b (where i’s origin is the SW corner); in the regressions later, we use speciﬁcally
KURatioij ≡ |ln(ki=ui) − ln(kj=uj)|.
By contrast, measuring the diﬀerence in economic size along the SW-NE diagonal in Figure 4a
(from i’s origin to j’s origin) has not been done traditionally in the international trade literature.
Typically, deviations in economic size are captured by variables such as shishj, discussed earlier in
equation (1), where shi is the share of country i’s GDP in the sum of countries’ i’s and j’s GDPs.
However, one cannot just use shishj to capture the diﬀerence in endowments of both K and U along
the SW-NE diagonal in Figure 4a. The reason is that – when ki and ui are very small – si in Figure
4a is still 0.5; hence in an Edgeworth box, variation in ki and ui along the diagonal changes relative
factor endowments as well. However, there is a way to capture variation along the SW-NE diagonal
in Figure 4a (for a given si). Using the geometric properties of the Edgeworth box, variation in the














22Omitted ﬁgure for VMNE activity conﬁrms this.
17A rise in KUDiffij reﬂects a wider diﬀerence in ki and ui relative to kj and uj. We expect
KUDiffij to be positively related to the probability of a BIT.
Finally, we provide no other hypotheses regarding the eﬀects of relative factor endowments. Ex-
amination of the analogous comparative statics in S − U space and in K − S space yielded no clear
empirically “testable” relationships between relative factor endowments and the utility gains or losses
from a BIT or PTA.23 Finally, in order to evaluate Hypotheses 5 and 6 holding constant si and
sj = (1 − si), we include the variable Ssimij deﬁned as:
Ssimij ≡ lnsi + ln(1 − si) (3)
as a control variable.
6 Econometric Specication, Data Description, and Empirical Re-
sults
6.1 Econometric Specication
As in Baier and Bergstrand (2004), the econometric framework employed is the qualitative choice
model of McFadden (1975, 1976). A qualitative choice model can be derived from an underlying
latent variable model. For instance, let the underlying latent variable be denoted y*. In that study,
y* represented the diﬀerence in utility levels from an action (formation of a PTA), where
y
ij = xij + eij; (4)
where xij denoted a vector of explanatory variables (i.e., economic characteristics) of country-pair ij
including a constant,  was a vector of parameters, and error term eij was assumed to be independent of
xij and to have a standard normal distribution. In the context of the model formally, y
ij = ∆Ui+∆Uj
where ∆Ui (∆Uj) denotes the change in utility for the representative consumer in i (j) from a BIT or
PTA. We are assuming implicitly the existence of transfers between the two countries’ governments so
that the relevant consideration is that the sum of the utility changes of the two countries’ representative
consumers needs to positive for their governments to form a BIT or PTA.
Since y
ij is unobservable, following McFadden (1975, 1976) Baier and Bergstrand (2004) deﬁned
an indicator variable, PTAij, which assumed the value 1 if two countries have a PTA and 0 otherwise,
23It will be important later for econometric purposes that BIT is likely related to KUDiffij but not to KURatioij,
and vice-versa for PTA. This satisﬁes the necessary exclusion restriction for estimating a simultaneous equation system
in the robustness analysis later.
18with the response probability, Pr, for PTA:
Pr(PTAij = 1) = Pr(y
ij > 0) = G(xij); (5)
where G(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, which ensured that Pr(PTAij =
1) was between 0 and 1. As conventional to this econometric literature, Pr(PTAij = 1) > 0:5
“indicated” y
ij > 0 and Pr(PTAij = 1) ≤ 0:5 indicated y
ij ≤ 0.
In this study, we are concerned with the determination of two probabilities, Pr(PTAij) and
Pr(BITij). As our theoretical model suggests, common factors may inﬂuence both probabilities
simultaneously. Due to the likely presence of correlated error terms, we employ a bivariate probit
model to estimate the likelihood of BITs and PTAs simultaneously.24
6.2 Data Description
A general equilibrium model such as the one outlined earlier is mainly informative about long-run
economic relationships. Therefore, as in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) we use cross section data to
infer the aforementioned hypotheses. These data capture the state of BITs and PTAs as of year 2000
and use explanatory variables which are averages of the ﬁve years prior to 2000. With regard to the
dependent and independent variables, we use data from the following sources.
First, information on BITs in force as of 2000 was collected from the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). We use this information to deﬁne a binary variable BITij,
which is unity if countries i and j had a BIT in force by the end of the year 2000 and zero otherwise.
Second, we collected data on preferential trade agreements (customs unions, free trade areas, and other
preferential trade agreements) from the World Trade Organization (WTO) and individual countries’
sources. On the basis of that data, we deﬁned an indicator variable PTAij, which is unity whenever
two countries i and j had a preferential trade agreement in force (either under or outside of the
auspices of the WTO).
Third, data on a number of economic fundamentals such as real GDP in US dollars (GDPi),
labor force (Li), and gross ﬁxed capital formation at constant US dollars of 2000 (Ki) were taken
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2005). These variables were used to construct
the following determinants for our analysis: (i) a measure of bilateral economic size, GDPSumij =
ln(GDPi+GDPj); (ii) a measure of similarity in bilateral economic size, GDPSimij = ln[shi(1−shi)];
and (iii) capital endowments of country i, Ki, and, in turn, the variable ki = Ki=(Ki + Kj).25
24In a sensitivity analysis later, we also consider a 3SLS estimation of two linear probability models with endogenous
explanatory variables as well as a (recursive) simultaneous equations probit model.
25We calculate Ki by using the perpetual inventory method, following Leamer (1984). For this, we calculate an initial
19Fourth, data on skilled workers (S) come from a new database constructed by researchers at
the World Population Program of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
which establishes panel data on attained education of the average workers in a comparable way for
120 countries (see Lutz, Crespo Cuaresma, and Sanderson, 2008). These data serve to distinguish
between high-skilled workers (S) and low-skilled workers (U) in four education categories. We classify
workers in education categories 3 and 4 (corresponding to upper secondary and tertiary education) as
highly-skilled ones and workers with lower levels of attained education (categories 1 and 2) as unskilled
workers. This obtains si and ui as measures of i’s share of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively,
between i and j. Furthermore, we use si to construct Ssimij to hold constant relative endowments of
skilled workers between two countries i and j in some of the empirical speciﬁcations later (see above
for theoretical rationale).
Fifth, we use data on the distance between economic centers of countries (Distanceij), a common
land border indicator (Adjacencyij), and a common language indicator (Languageij). We use bilateral
distance not only to measure Distanceij but also to construct a measure remoteness (REMOTEij)
of country-pair ij from the rest of the world. The latter is constructed as an average distance of i and
j from all countries (except i and j), as in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and Egger and Larch (2008).
Sixth, we employ measures of political stability of nations’ governments (PolStabij) and the lack
(or the inverse) of expropriation risk (IExpRiskij) in countries i and j. The former is based on
data about political risk as published by BERI, and the latter we deﬁne as the inverse of investment
risk available from the same source. BERI provides cross-country time-series data on components
of risk. We deﬁne PolStabij such that a higher level measures greater political stability in the least
stable of the two countries. Moreover, we deﬁne IExpRiskij such that a higher level measures less
expropriation risk in the riskier one of two countries i and j for investments between them.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for all the variables used in this study.
6.3 Empirical Results
Table 3 presents the results based on seemingly unrelated bivariate probit models for BITs and PTAs.
These models allow for correlation of BITij and PTAij through two sources: (i) the observed deter-
minants of such agreements as included in the speciﬁcation of the latent process determining bivariate
stock of capital for year 0 in each country i, Ki0 =
∑ 1
t= 5 Iit, where t is a time index. This provides an estimate of the
initial capital stock for a chosen year 0 equivalent to the sum of gross ﬁxed capital investments in the ﬁve years prior to
that. We chose 1980 as the base year for all countries to make sure that the weight of measurement error of the initial
capital stock is negligible by 2000. Then, we calculate the capital stock in year 1 as Ki1 = 0:87Ki0 + Ii1, where 0:87 is
one minus the depreciation rate and Ii1 are i’s real gross investments in year 1, and so forth, until we obtain Ki as a
measure of the capital stock in the year 2000.
20binary outcomes26 and (ii) unobserved characteristics as included in the disturbances. Table 3 has
several columns presenting the results of including variables suggested by our discussion above incre-
mentally, similar to the presentation in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) for only PTAs. We will refer
below to “a” to denote a speciﬁcation associated with BITij and “b” refers to results associated with
PTAij.
Speciﬁcations 1a and 1b are reported to examine the eﬀects on the likelihood of a BIT and a PTA,
respectively, of variables from section 4, in particular, measures of economic size, economic similarity,
distance, trade costs, and investment costs. We consider ﬁrst economic size and similarity. We ﬁnd
that the sum and similarity of the two countries’ GDPs (GDPSumij and GDPSimij) have positive
and statistically signiﬁcant impacts on the likelihood of a BIT and of a PTA, as our theoretical model
suggested.27 This is the ﬁrst study to ﬁnd and explain the positive association between the economic
size and similarity of a pair of countries and the likelihood of their having a BIT. Other things the
same, country-pairs that are economically larger and more similar in size tend to have more FDI so
that these economies’ welfare will tend to rise more from a BIT, increasing the likelihood of their
forming one. Moreover, country-pairs that are economically larger and more similar in size tend to
have more trade so that these economies’ welfare will tend to rise more from a PTA, increasing the
likelihood of their forming one. Hence, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are conﬁrmed.
We now turn to Distanceij, Adjacencyij and Languageij. As in Baier and Bergstrand (2004),
Distanceij was included as a proxy for “natural” trade costs.28 However, bilateral distance is well-
known from the gravity-equation literature to have a negative, economically signiﬁcant, and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant impact both on bilateral trade ﬂows and bilateral FDI ﬂows. Consequently, one might
argue that bilateral distance is not capturing “trade” costs per se but rather trade as well as other
“information” costs.
However, although the marginal response probabilities will be provided later, there is some in-
formation content in the relative coeﬃcient estimates for Distanceij from Speciﬁcations 1a and 1b,
consistent with gravity equations of FDI and trade. For instance, typically in gravity equations esti-
mated using ordinary least squares (absolute values of) coeﬃcient estimates on Distanceij are smaller
for FDI ﬂows relative to trade ﬂows, cf., Berden, Bergstrand, and van Etten (2011), even though there
are very few studies that estimate both trade and FDI gravity equations in the same study using a
common speciﬁcation. This result is consistent with the following notion. FDI ﬂows are motivated
26Following McFadden, the latent processes underlying BITij and PTAij could be interpreted as the net gains for
country-pair ij from concluding one or the other type of agreement.
27We discuss the economic signiﬁcance of these and other coeﬃcients later in the section on marginal response proba-
bilities.
28Distanceij is the natural logarithm of the country-pair’s bilateral distance. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) used the
variable NATURALij, which was simply the log of the inverse of bilateral distance.
21from two sources, with “trade costs” having opposite eﬀects. Much vertical FDI is to set up plants
abroad which serve as export platforms back to the home country; trade costs (as proxied by dis-
tance) should have a negative eﬀect on this FDI. However, horizontal FDI sets up plants abroad to
“jump-over” trade costs, so such costs should have a positive eﬀect on this FDI. The smaller nega-
tive coeﬃcient estimate for bilateral distance in gravity equations for FDI relative to trade ﬂows is
consistent with this behavior. Since BITs are intended to enhance FDI ﬂows, the smaller negative
coeﬃcient estimate for Distanceij is consistent with this explanation.29
Speciﬁcations 1a and 1b reveal opposite coeﬃcient signs between the BITs and PTA probits for
Adjacencyij and Languageij. These two variables are the most commonly used dummies in gravity
equations of trade ﬂows and typically have economically and statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀects.
It is interesting to ﬁnd that these two variables have economically and statistically signiﬁcant negative
coeﬃcient estimates in the BITs equation but positive coeﬃcient estimates in the PTA equation.
These results are consistent with (the trade-cost portions of) Hypotheses 3 and 4. As Figure 3b
suggests, the likelihood of a PTA should be greater between two countries the lower their trade costs,
which implies a positive relationship between Adjacencyij and Languageij with Pr(PTAij = 1). But
lower trade costs discourage horizontal FDI, which suggests (as in Figure 1a) that the net utility
change for a pair of countries from a BIT is a negative function of Adjacencyij and of Languageij.
Thus, the results are consistent with inferring that sharing a common land border and a common
language reduce trade costs.
However, it would be useful to have explicit measures of investment costs in order to determine
if the remaining (investment-cost) portions of Hypotheses 3 and 4 are conﬁrmed. Speciﬁcations 2a
and 2b augment Speciﬁcations 1a and 1b to include a measure of “investment costs.” The measure
employed here is the index PolStabij described above, which is increasing in the perceived degree of
political stability. In a recent study of several governance indicators and their relationships to FDI
and trade ﬂows (cf., Berden, Bergstrand, and van Etten, 2011), the measure of political stability had
a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on FDI ﬂows and an estimated zero eﬀect on trade ﬂows,
suggesting a plausible measure of investment costs; moreover, this variable had an economically and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on FDI relative to trade. Speciﬁcation 2a reveals that greater political
stability in the host country, by lowering investment costs and enlarging FDI, leads country-pairs to
be more likely to form a BIT. This conﬁrms Hypothesis 3. Moreover, PolStabij has the opposite
eﬀect on the likelihood of a PTA. An increase in political stability reduces investment costs, which
decreases the net utility gains from a bilateral PTA, consistent with Figure 3b and Hypothesis 4.
29See also Egger and Pfaﬀermayr (2004b) on this issue. These authors ﬁnd opposite eﬀects of distance, negative for
trade and positive for FDI, consistent with our interpretation.
22Figures 4a and 4b and Hypotheses 5 and 6 suggest relationships between ki and ui with the
welfare eﬀects (and, hence, likelihoods) of BITs and PTAs. Figure 4a suggests a positive relationship
between diﬀerences in ki and ui with kj and uj (KUDiffij) and the utility gains to i and j from a BIT,
as a higher value of KUDiffij is associated with a larger relative abundance of skilled labor in either i
or j, which favors more MNEs and FDI. Figure 4b suggests a negative relationship between diﬀerences
in ki=ui relative to kj=uj (KUratioij) and the utility gains to i and j from a PTA. Wider relative
K=U ratios between i and j lead to more NEs trade, but a large decline in HMNEs activity, such that
on net a PTA is welfare decreasing. Speciﬁcations 3a and 3b conﬁrm the qualitative impacts of these
two variables on their respective probabilities as consistent with these two hypotheses. Higher skilled
labor abundance of either i or j leads to a higher probability of a BIT between them as expected. A
wider K=U ratio between i and j leads to a lower probability of a PTA between them as expected.
Thus, all six hypotheses suggested by the numerical comparative statics discussed earlier are
supported empirically.
6.4 Robustness Analysis
Tables 4 and 5 report the results of six additional sets of speciﬁcations to evaluate the sensitivity of
our results to numerous issues.
6.4.1 Robustness to Expropriation Risk Measure
A measure of political stability from BERI was used as an (inverse) index of natural investment costs.
We showed that this index had opposite eﬀects on the probability of a BIT versus a PTA. Berden,
Bergstrand, and van Etten (2011) showed that more political stability tends to be positively correlated
with FDI-relative-to-trade ﬂows, suggesting it is an (inverse) measure of investment costs. However,
it is important to note that political stability works indirectly through FDI on the utility gains from
a BIT. Less political stability will tend to reduce FDI so that the net utility gains from a BIT are
lowered.
However, a more direct measure of investment costs – in particular, an index of expropriation risk –
might inﬂuence the likelihood of a BIT directly. That is, less expropriation risk may directly lower the
probability of a BIT, since this is one of the early main motivations for a BIT. For instance, Aisbett
(2009) formed a political economy model of BIT formation motivated by expropriation risk. Inspired
by this work, we introduce IEXPriskij to our model in Speciﬁcations 4a and 4b, which is a measure
of inverse (or lack of) expropriation risk, reported in Table 4. IExpRiskij is a bilateral variable
measuring the inverse of expropriation risk for the most risky member of the pair of countries i and j;
23a higher value denotes less expropriation risk of the most risky member of the pair. If expropriation
risk has a direct impact on the likelihood of a BIT, then IEXPriskij would be expected to have
a negative coeﬃcient estimate in the BITs equation. We note that this variable has the expected
negative eﬀect on the probability of BITij in Speciﬁcation 4a; with less expropriation risk in the
most risky country of the pair, there is less need for a BIT to protect the investment interests of the
less risky country. This result is consistent with the model in Aisbett (2009). Moreover, the other
coeﬃcient estimates are robust to its inclusion.
6.4.2 Robustness to Including GDP Similarity
As discussed earlier, once we introduced measures of relative factor endowments that – in 3-dimensional
Edgeworth-box space – also inﬂuenced relative economic sizes, it seemed appropriate to eliminate the
variable measuring relative economic size, GDPSimij. However, one may argue that some results for
relative factor endowments are biased by exclusion of GDPSimij as a compact measure of similarity in
absolute factor endowments. Speciﬁcations 5a and 5b add GDPSimij back into the bivariate probit
model. We see that the results are inﬂuenced only trivially. Although the coeﬃcient estimate for
GDPSimij is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level in the PTAij equation, it is
insigniﬁcant in the BITij equation of the bivariate probit model. In both equations, none of the other
coeﬃcient estimates changes materially. Therefore, in the subsequent analysis of marginal response
probabilities and for predicting particular BITs and PTAs, we include GDPSimij but all our results
generalize to excluding it as well.
6.4.3 Robustness to Including REMOTE
Another variable examined in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) was the “remoteness” of a country pair.
In their model, the more economically remote a pair of countries was, the greater the utility gains
from and likelihood of a PTA, as more remote countries trade more all else constant. We can show in
the context of this paper’s model with NEs and MNEs that the utility gains from either a BIT or a
PTA are increasing in the “remoteness” of the pair. (For brevity, ﬁgures are omitted.)
Speciﬁcations 6a and 6b add to the previous speciﬁcation the measure of remoteness used in Baier
and Bergstrand (2004). For the PTA equation of the probit model, REMOTEij has a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect, as expected. By contrast, the coeﬃcient estimate is negative for the BITs
equation; however, it is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for that equation. Moreover,
its inclusion has no material eﬀect on the other coeﬃcient estimates.
246.4.4 Robustness to Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements
As discussed earlier, some of the PTAs in our sample are actually preferential trade and investment
agreements (PTIAs), such as the European Union (EU) and NAFTA. Since our dependent variable for
BITs is actual bilateral investment treaties, investment liberalizations covered under “trade” agree-
ments are not included in our BITs dependent variable. Hence, for Germany and France, PTAij is
recorded as a 1 whereas BITij is recorded as a 0. We approached this issue two alternative ways.
Speciﬁcations 7a and 7b in Table 5 comprise the bivariate probit model where we include an “adjusted”
variable for BIT. The new variable – AdjBIT – includes also any bilateral investment agreements
akin to BITs that are within country-pairs’ PTIAs. We modiﬁed 108 “0’s” to “1’s” of the BIT variable
to capture the inﬂuence of investment agreements in the EU and in NAFTA as representing BITs. A
comparison of the results in Speciﬁcations 6a and 6b using BITs and PTAs with those in Speciﬁcations
7a and 7b in Table 5 using the adjusted-BITs variable and PTAs shows that the results are materially
the same in the two sets of speciﬁcations.
Alternatively, we could simply remove all the PTIAs from our sample. However, we note that – if
anything – the inclusion of PTIAs in our sample of PTAs would tend to bias the results against us. For
instance, the coeﬃcient estimates for Adjacency, Common Language, Political Stability, and Inverse
Expropriation Risk are expected to have opposite signs for PTAs and BITs. The inclusion of PTIAs
in our PTA sample would tend to bias the coeﬃcient estimates for these variables toward similar signs
for PTAs and BITs. Yet, we ﬁnd economically and statistically signiﬁcant opposite coeﬃcient signs
for these variables across BITs and PTAs. This suggests that it is the trade provisions that are the
primary element in our PTA variable. Nevertheless, we also re-ran Speciﬁcations 6a and 6b in Table 4
deleting the 108 observations associated with the EU members and NAFTA members, and the results
do not change signiﬁcantly enough to be presented. The only material changes were for the BITS
speciﬁcation where the Adjacency and Inverse Expropriation coeﬃcient estimates became statistically
insigniﬁcant (they had been marginally signiﬁcant; their coeﬃcient values remained basically the
same); there were no material changes in the PTAs speciﬁcation.
6.4.5 Robustness to Recursive Simultaneous Bivariate Probit Estimation
It is possible that the latent variable inﬂuencing the probability of a PTA for two countries also
inﬂuences the latent variable inﬂuencing the probability of a BIT between the pair, or vice-versa.
That is, the determination of the probabilities of PTAij and BITij may be better represented by
a simultaneous equations probit model. However, there is no econometric theoretical foundation for
estimating a simultaneous equations probit model for BITs and PTAs where both endogenous variables
25appear as explanatory variables (PTA aﬀecting BIT in one equation and BIT aﬀecting PTA in the
other equation, cf., Wooldridge, 2002). However, there is econometric theory for estimating a recursive
simultaneous equations model with one of the endogenous variables entering one of the equations, cf.,
Schmidt (1981) and Wooldridge (2002, pp. 477-478). Moreover, in order to evaluate which equation
should have the endogenous explanatory variable, we turn for guidance to a three-stage least squares
(3SLS) estimation of two linear probability models ﬁrst.
Models 8a and 8b in Table 5 report the results of estimating the linear probability versions of
BIT and PTA using 3SLS. The notable ﬁnding from these two equations is that the PTA equation
has no statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates, including that for BIT. By contrast, the 3SLS
estimates of the BIT equation show that the existence of a PTA does have a statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the existence of a BIT and the other coeﬃcient estimates are plausible.30 Given there is
only empirical evidence that PTA causes BIT (using the 3SLS estimates), we estimated a recursive
simultaneous probit equations model of BIT and PTA, where PTA was allowed to be an endogenous
explanatory variable for the BIT equation. These estimates are reported in Speciﬁcations 9a and 9b
of Table 5. The main ﬁnding is that PTA does have a statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the
existence of a BIT. However, importantly none of the other coeﬃcient estimates of the BIT equation
are materially diﬀerent from those in bivariate probit Speciﬁcations 6a and 6b in Table 4. The BIT
equation is basically robust to including the endogenous explanatory variable PTA. Also, the PTA
equation in Speciﬁcation 9b is very similar to that in Speciﬁcation 6b; the PTA equation is also robust
as we never ﬁnd any evidence of BITs aﬀecting PTAs.
6.4.6 Caveat for Interdependence
In reality, the net utility gains from and likelihood of a BIT or PTA between a country-pair ij are
inﬂuenced by either country’s BITs and PTAs with other countries k (k ̸= i;j) or by BITs and PTAs
among other country-pairs kl (kl ̸= ij). Egger and Larch (2008) was mainly devoted to exploring
the eﬀect of other agreements (henceforth, “interdependence”) on the likelihood of a country-pair ij
forming a PTA. Econometrically, Egger and Larch (2008) handled the issue using “spatial lags” of
other agreements; they did so using both a panel and a cross-section. In their panel analysis, the
interdependence variable was constructed using a spatial lag of other agreements ﬁve years prior to
the period examined.
Unfortunately, as in Baier and Bergstrand (2004), we are limited here to a cross-section and
constructing a panel of BITij is beyond this paper’s scope. The problem with a cross-section, as in
30Note that one cannot compare the sizes of these coeﬃcient estimates since the linear probability model generates
marginal eﬀects.
26Egger and Larch (2008), is that the spatial lag introduces a potential endogeneity bias because the
spatial lag would be constructed using other BITs from the concurrent year. In a univariate setting as
in Egger and Larch (2008), the endogeneity bias could be avoided by a re-transformation of the spatial
lag model. However, even in the univariate case, two problems arose there: multiple integrals in the
likelihood function and heteroskedasticity in the error terms. Consequently, they applied a Bayesian
Markov-Chain Monte Carlo model requiring estimation using Gibbs sampling. This complicated and
resource-intensive estimation technique would need to be somehow adapted econometrically for our
bivariate system, an extensive undertaking well beyond the scope of this paper.
That said, we note that a comparison of the spatial and non-spatial cross-section models in Egger
and Larch (2008) suggested that any bias introduced from ignoring the spatial lag was not exces-
sive. All the coeﬃcient estimates in the two models had identical coeﬃcient and marginal-response-
probability signs, although some variables’ marginal response probabilities were quantitatively dif-
ferent. Moreover, the overall explanatory power of the two models were similar. While exploring
interdependence remains a useful extension in this context, we leave this for future research because
of the scope of the undertaking needed.
6.5 Marginal Response Probabilities and Predictions
In this section, we report two sets of ﬁndings. We discuss the marginal response probabilities of one-
standard-deviation changes in the right-hand-side variables. Then, we summarize the percentages of
correctly predicted PTAs and BITs (ones) and the correctly predicted “No-PTAs” and “No-BITs”
(zeros) from the models.
6.5.1 Marginal Response Probabilities
Probit estimates cannot reveal the quantitative eﬀect of a change in any RHS variable on the probabil-
ity of a BIT or PTA. Given the standard bivariate normal distribution, we can calculate the marginal
response probabilities to unit- or one-standard-deviation changes in the RHS variables. For brevity,
we report only in Table 6 the marginal response probabilities to one-standard-deviation changes in
the RHS variables, although the other results are available on request. Since it is a bivariate probit
model, we report both the unconditional and conditional response probabilities.
First, the variable that has the largest quantitative eﬀect on either the probability of a BIT or a
PTA is economic size. Moreover, a one-standard-deviation change in GDP size has a larger eﬀect on
the likelihood of a BIT than on that of a PTA. This result accords well with an empirical result in
Bergstrand and Egger (2007) that FDI ﬂows are more elastic with respect to changes in economic size
27than are trade ﬂows; consequently, the likelihood of a BIT is more responsive to size changes than is
that of a PTA.
Second, GDP similarity has an economically and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on PTAs, but not
on BITs, consistent with results found earlier. As discussed earlier, Ssim and KUDiff (for BITs)
may be capturing empirically the role of size similarity.
Third, distance has a much larger (negative) impact on the likelihood of PTAs than on that for
BITs. This is consistent with the discussion earlier; the inﬂuence of distance on the likelihood of BITs
is likely muted by the trade-cost-jumping role of horizontal FDI. Also, of Adjacency and Language,
only Adjacency has a signiﬁcant marginal response probability. Of the two variables, Adjacency has a
clearer economic interpretation, as an inverse natural-trade-cost measure. Lower trade costs associated
with adjacent economies increases trade, reduces horizontal FDI, and lowers the likelihood of a BIT.
Fourth, both measures of investment costs have economically and statistically signiﬁcant marginal
response probabilities in the expected direction for likelihood of BITs and for likelihood of PTAs.
Interestingly, a one-standard-deviation increase in the political stability index has a much larger
absolute quantitative eﬀect on the probability of a BIT than a one-standard-deviation increase in
the (inverse) expropriation risk index.
Fifth, both relative factor endowment variables have economically and statistically signiﬁcant
marginal response eﬀects on their respective probabilities. Interestingly, the negative eﬀect on the
probability of a PTA of a one-standard-deviation increase in relative K/U ratios is considerably larger
quantitatively than the positive eﬀect on the probability of a BIT of a one-standard-deviation increase
in the relative skilled-labor abundance of countries i and j. This actually accords well with Figures 4a
and 4b, where the negative welfare eﬀect from a PTA of widening K/U ratios was considerably larger
(in absolute terms) than the positive welfare eﬀect from a BIT of a widening of ki and ui relative to
kj and uj (and consequently larger skilled-labor abundance of i or j).
6.5.2 Explanatory Power and Predicted Probabilities
One of the interesting results from the original Baier and Bergstrand (2004) study was the high pseudo-
R2 value of 73 percent in their fullest speciﬁcation of explaining the likelihood of PTAs. However,
this study examined only 1,145 pairings of 54 countries. In a much larger and less selective cross-
section using 146 countries and 10,585 country-pairs, Egger and Larch (2008) showed that the Baier-
Bergstrand results held up, but the overall explanatory power, as captured by the pseudo-R2, was
unsurprisingly much smaller at 27 percent. In this study, we use an even larger data set than Egger-
Larch, with 161 countries and 12,880 observations. Moreover, explaining the likelihood of PTAs
28and BITs simultaneously is a larger challenge. Hence, our pseudo-R2 of 21 percent in our fullest
speciﬁcation, Model 6, is a strong result, in this context.
In the spirit of Baier and Bergstrand (2004) for just PTAs, we also consider here the percent of
correctly predicted, both for “True Positives” and for “True Negatives.” However, in this bivariate
model, we are calculating percent correctly predicted for each of the four outcomes: True Positives
for BITs and PTAs and True Negatives for BITs and PTAs. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) conducted
this statistical summary for their cross-section analysis of year 1996 for PTAs and found that their
model predicted correctly 243 of 286 PTAs, or 85 percent (using a cutoﬀ probability of 0.5). They
also predicted 1,114 of the 1,145 pairs without PTAs correctly, or 97 percent. However, this sample
was quite small, and Egger and Larch conducted a similar analysis using their larger cross-section
of 10,585 country-pairs. Using a cutoﬀ probability of 0.5 for year 2000, the percent PTAs correctly
predicted was 62 percent and the percent of “No-PTAs” correctly predicted was 98 percent.
In this study, we considered three potential cutoﬀ probabilities. First, for comparison with Baier-
Bergstrand and Egger-Larch, we considered a cutoﬀ probability of 0.5. Table 7 provides the percent
correctly predicted for the various outcomes at a cutoﬀ probability of 0.5 in the second column using
Model 6. While the overall correct prediction rate of BITs and No-BITs was 77 percent, the model
correctly predicted only 17 percent of BITs correctly (the True-Positive rate) with a True-Negative
rate of 85 percent. However, our bivariate probit model also did not perform as well for PTAs as
compared to the univariate model in Egger and Larch (2008). Model 6 predicted only 76 percent
of PTAs and No-PTAs correctly. It predicted 29 percent of the PTAs correctly and 84 percent of
the No-PTAs correctly. In summary, the overall prediction rate for PTAs in the bivariate model was
much less than that in the Baier-Bergstrand and Egger-Larch univariate models, but the overall BITs
prediction rate was roughly comparable to the PTAs prediction rate in this model.
Second, it is important to note, however, that a cutoﬀ probability of 0.5 is probably not a very
relevant one. The reason is that PTAs and BITs are still somewhat rare events. As Table 1 showed,
of 12,880 country-pairs in year 2000, only 1,479 had BITs and only 2,034 had PTAs. Thus, the
unconditional probability of having a BIT is 11 percent and that of having a PTA is 16 percent. A
cutoﬀ probability of 0.5 consequently is too extreme a cutoﬀ. Cohen et. al. (2003) suggest using a
priori information about the proportion of (PTA and BIT) events and non-events in our population.
The third column of Table 7 shows the percent correctly predicted using the unconditional probabilities
for BITs (E(BIT) = 0:11) and PTAs (E(PTA) = 0:16) for cutoﬀs, as has been used in the statistical
literature. Using the cutoﬀ for BITs of 0.11, the percent of BITs correctly predicted was 85 percent
and the percent of No-BITs correctly predicted was 62 percent. Using the cutoﬀ for PTAs of 0.16, the
29percent of PTAs correctly predicted was 75 percent and the percent of No-PTAs correctly predicted
was 65 percent.
We note that both of these prediction rates are well below that of Baier and Bergstrand (2004).
However, two factors need to be emphasized again: Baier and Bergstrand (2004) predicted PTAs using
a univariate probit model and that study dealt with a much smaller number of (select) observations.
We have both a larger sample here as well as a bivariate probit model. Nevertheless, the lower level
of predictability of True Positives and True Negatives found here – in the ﬁrst systematic attempt at
explaining empirically the likelihood of BITs – suggests room for further research.
In the spirit of considering other approaches, note that the goodness of ﬁt in terms of correctly
predicted binary outcomes can be determined in various ways. In general, such goodness of ﬁt in uni-
variate nonlinear binary response models will depend on the cutoﬀ level chosen to determine predicted
positive and negative outcomes (positive referring to a unitary entry in the indicator and negative to
a zero entry). Custom measures of goodness of ﬁt are the so-called Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) and Matthew’s (1975) Correlation Coeﬃcient (MCC).
We will focus in the remainder of this section on the latter, since the former can not be generalized in
a straightforward to allow for a graphical representation of goodness of ﬁt while the latter can be.
MCC represents a correlation coeﬃcient between observed and predicted binary outcome and
takes on real numbers in the interval MCC ∈ [−1;+1]. A higher level of MCC reﬂects a better
prediction of positive as well as negative binary outcomes (see Baldi, Brunak, Chauvin, Andersen,
and Nielsen, 2000). While Matthew (1975) focused on the case of models with a single binary in-
dicator, we face a bivariate relationship for two indicators (BITij and PTAij). Matthew’s idea was
the following. Divide the unit interval for the probability support region for a single dependent bi-
nary outcome variable into segments of equal size and refer to them as pℓ = 0;:::;1. Altogether,
there will be P such elements pℓ. Then, following Matthew (1975), one may calculate a correla-
tion coeﬃcient based on True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP), and False
Negative (FN) events. Predictions of treatment status depend on the chosen cutoﬀ level pℓ for pre-
dicted success probabilities. For instance, with a univariate probit model for PTA membership as
in Baier and Bergstrand (2004), one could state that [ PTAij(pℓ) = 1 if Pr(PTAij|Xij) > pℓ where
Xij is the vector of explanatory variables determining the latent process underlying PTAij. Then,

















j [(1 − [ PTAij(pℓ))Pij(pℓ)]. This obtains
MCCℓ =
TPℓTNℓ − FPℓFNℓ √
(TPℓ + FPℓ)(TPℓ + FNℓ)(TNℓ + FPℓ)(TNℓ + FNℓ)
:
30With a bivariate probit model, we may consider two cutoﬀ probabilities, say, pℓ and p∂. For
convenience, let us refer to pℓ as the one for PTAs and p∂ as the one for BITs. Then, one can
determine TPA,ℓ∂, TNA,ℓ∂, FPA,ℓ∂, FNA,ℓ∂ for each A ∈ [PTA;BIT]. Furthermore, we may calculate
TPℓ∂ =
∑
A TPA,ℓ∂ and similarly for TNℓ∂, FPℓ∂, FNℓ∂. It is important to note that these outcomes
depend on both cutoﬀ levels. Accordingly, we can formulate
MCCℓ∂ =
TPℓ∂TNℓ∂ − FPℓ∂FNℓ∂ √
(TPℓ∂ + FPℓ∂)(TPℓ∂ + FNℓ∂)(TNℓ∂ + FPℓ∂)(TNℓ∂ + FNℓ∂)
: (6)
Figure 5 may be viewed as graphical illustration of the generalized MCC as in (6) in bivariate cutoﬀ
space (pℓ;p∂). The optimal cutoﬀ level lies wherever the function drawn reaches its maximum. This
happens to be the case at a probability cutoﬀ level of about 0:25 for PTAs and of about 0:24 for
BITs. At those cutoﬀs, the correlation coeﬃcient between predicted and actual binary outcomes is 39
percent.
7 Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to develop an econometric model that explains the “economic” determi-
nants of BITs – at the same time as explaining PTAs – as well as predicting successfully the likelihood
of pairs of countries forming BITs and FTAs. In the spirit of Baier and Bergstrand (2004), which
explained PTAs in the context of a general equilibrium model of world trade with exporters, the model
in this study is the ﬁrst econometric model to explain BITs (along with PTAs) in the context of an
explicit general equilibrium model of world production, consumption, trade, and FDI with national
and multinational ﬁrms in multiple countries on multiple continents.
The main conclusions are that the potential welfare gains from and likelihood of a BIT (PTA)
between a country-pair are higher: (1) the larger and more similar in GDP are the country-pair; (2)
the closer in distance are the two countries; (3) if the two countries are not adjacent (are adjacent) and
do not share (do share) a common language; (4) the higher (lower) the degrees of political stability
and of expropriation risk of the pair; and (5) the relatively more skilled labor abundant (the wider the
relative K/U ratio of) the pair. These factors have economically and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on
the probability of a BIT (PTA).
While there exist choices of cutoﬀ probabilities in determining the percent correctly predicted of
the alternative outcomes, using the unconditional probabilities, the preferred empirical model predicts
correctly 85 percent of BITs while predicting correctly 62 percent of “No-BIT” events and simultane-
ously predicts correctly 75 percent of PTAs while predicting correctly 65 percent of “No-PTA” events.
31The model provides a benchmark for incorporating other economic – and especially political science
and legal variables – into understanding the determinants of BITs.
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Prob. cutoff for positive BIT
Matthew´s correlation coefficient for the bivariate probit model
Prob. cutoff for positive PTATable 1 - Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and  Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) 
              Across 12,880 Country-Pairs in Year 2000
Yes (1) No (0) Sum
Yes (1) 556 923 1479
No (0) 1478 9923 11401
Sum 2034 10846 12880
Notes: There are 161 countries (12,880 pairs) in the sample.
PTAs
BITsTable 2 - Summary statistics for Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and their Key Determinants
Variable Acronym Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Dependent variables
   Bilateral Investment Treaty indicator BITij 0.115 0.319 1.000 0.000
   Preferential Trade Agreement indicator PTAij 0.158 0.365 1.000 0.000
Independent variables
   Log sum of i's and j's real GDP GDPSumij 24.995 1.834 26.532 1.390 25.468 1.575
   Log similarity of i's and j's real GDP GDPSimij -0.537 1.597 -0.793 1.790 -0.474 1.291
   Log bilateral distance between i's and j's economic centers DISTij 8.193 0.789 7.752 0.965 7.566 1.064
   Adjacency indicator between i and j ADJij 0.021 0.142 0.045 0.207 0.084 0.277
   Common official language indicator between i and j LANGij 0.128 0.334 0.110 0.313 0.162 0.369
   Political stability between i and j PolStabij 72.875 11.764 80.010 9.473 73.907 11.673
   Inverse expropriation risk between i and j IExpRiskij 8.484 1.830 9.017 1.556 8.666 1.687
   Log absolute difference in relative capital-unskilled labor ratios between i and j KURatioij 2.349 1.713 2.010 1.536 1.615 1.231
   Log absolute difference in capital and unskilled labor shares between i and j KUDiffij -2.727 2.388 -2.466 2.155 -2.431 2.027
   Log similarity of i's and j's skilled labor endowment shares Ssimij -2.406 1.156 -2.390 1.149 -2.153 0.858
   Log distance of i and j to the rest of the world REMOTEij 8.436 0.153 8.385 0.163 8.403 0.180
Unconditional At BIT=1 At PTA=1Table 3 - The Determinants of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit Models:
Main Results
Determinants Acronym BITs PTAs BITs PTAs BITs PTAs
   Log sum of i's and j's real GDPs GDPSumij 0.374 *** 0.147 *** 0.327 *** 0.160 *** 0.353 *** 0.203 ***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
   Log similarity of i's and j's real GDPs GDPSimij 0.035 *** 0.058 *** 0.029 *** 0.060 ***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
   Log bilateral distance between i's and j's economic centers DISTij -0.529 *** -0.617 *** -0.509 *** -0.614 *** -0.475 *** -0.542 ***
(0.022) (0.020) 0.022 (0.021) (0.023) (0.021)
   Adjacency indicator between i and j ADJij -0.341 *** 0.398 *** -0.242 ** 0.342 *** -0.233 * 0.280 ***
(0.116) (0.099) (0.123) (0.100) (0.126) (0.101)
   Common official language indicator between i and j LANGij -0.091 * 0.087 ** -0.087 0.048 -0.064 0.091 **
(0.053) (0.041) (0.054) (0.042) (0.056) (0.046)
   Political stability between i and j PolStabij - - 0.017 *** -0.005 *** 0.015 *** -0.007 ***
- - (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
   Log absolute difference in capital and unskilled labor shares between i and j KUDiffij - - - - 0.029 *** -
- - - - (0.009) -
   Log absolute difference in relative capital-unskilled labor ratios between i and j KURatioij - - - - - -0.166 ***
- - - - - (0.010)
   Log similarity of i's and j's skilled labor endowment shares Ssimij - - - - 0.169 *** 0.226 ***
- - - - (0.021) (0.017)
   Constant -6.436 *** 0.296 -6.679 *** 0.334 -7.018 *** -0.333
(0.272) (0.233) (0.286) (0.236) (0.299) (0.253)
Observations
Countries
Correlation between disturbances in BITs and RTA processes
Standard error of correlation coefficient above
Log-likelihood of model
Log-likelihood of constant-only model
McFadden pseudo-R
2
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 























151Table 4 - The Determinants of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probits:
A Sensitivity Analysis
Determinants Acronym BITs PTAs BITs PTAs BITs PTAs
   Log sum of i's and j's real GDPs GDPSumij 0.352 *** 0.205 *** 0.352 *** 0.209 *** 0.352 *** 0.210 ***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
   Log similarity of i's and j's real GDPs GDPSimij 0.000 0.017 * 0.000 0.022 **
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
   Log bilateral distance between i's and j's economic centers DISTij -0.475 *** -0.544 *** -0.475 *** -0.543 *** -0.467 *** -0.662 ***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.028) (0.026)
   Adjacency indicator between i and j ADJij -0.237 * 0.278 *** -0.237 * 0.280 *** -0.226 * 0.139
(0.126) (0.101) (0.126) (0.101) (0.128) (0.104)
   Common official language indicator between i and j LANGij -0.054 0.083 * -0.054 0.084 * -0.045 -0.009
(0.056) (0.046) (0.056) (0.046) (0.058) (0.049)
   Political stability between i and j PolStabij 0.017 *** -0.009 *** 0.017 *** -0.009 *** 0.017 *** -0.010 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
   Inverse expropriation risk between i and j IExpRiskij -0.024 * 0.020 * -0.024 * 0.019 * -0.024 * 0.024 **
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
   Log absolute difference in capital and unskilled labor shares between i and j KUDiffij 0.031 *** - 0.031 *** - 0.031 *** -
     (0.009) - (0.009) - (0.009) -
   Log absolute difference in relative capital-unskilled labor ratios between I and j KURatioij - -0.164 *** - -0.162 *** - -0.147 ***
- (0.010) - (0.010) - (0.010)
   Log similarity of i's and j's skilled labor endowment shares Ssimij 0.172 *** 0.225 *** 0.172 *** 0.224 *** 0.172 *** 0.236 ***
(0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.016) (0.021) (0.017)
   Log distance of i and j to the rest of the world REMOTEij - - - - -0.074 1.029 ***
- - - - (0.136) (0.122)
   Constant -6.933 *** -0.395 -6.936 *** -0.474 * -6.386 *** -8.216 ***
(0.304) (0.254) (0.310) (0.258) (1.071) (0.940)
Observations
Countries
Correlation between disturbances in BITs and RTA processes
Standard error of correlation coefficient above
Log-likelihood of model
Log-likelihood of constant-only model
McFadden pseudo-R
2 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively, using 2-tailed tests.











-9312.86Table 5 - The Determinants of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs): 
Further Sensitivity Analysis
Determinants Acronym AdjBITs PTAs BITs PTAs BITs PTAs
   Log sum of i's and j's real GDPs GDPSumij 0.399 *** 0.209 *** 0.026 *** 0.266  0.311 *** 0.210 ***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.350) (0.013) (0.011)
   Log similarity of i's and j's real GDPs GDPSimij 0.008 0.023 ** -0.004 * 0.004  -0.006 0.020 **
(0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
   Log bilateral distance between i's and j's economic centers DISTij -0.580 *** -0.664 *** 0.054 *** -0.508  -0.292 *** -0.657 ***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.019) (0.507) (0.034) (0.026)
   Adjacency indicator between i and j ADJij -0.151 0.141 -0.137 * -0.052  -0.285 ** 0.166  
(0.121) (0.104) (0.030) (0.284) (0.131) (0.109)
   Common official language indicator between i and j LANGij -0.067 -0.010 -0.006 * -0.047  -0.029 -0.010
(0.059) (0.049) (-0.570) (0.074) (0.058) (0.049)
   Political stability between i and j PolStabij 0.021 *** -0.010 *** 0.005 *** 0.013  0.019 *** -0.009 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.022) (0.002) (0.002)
   Inverse expropriation risk between i and j IExpRiskij -0.018 0.024 ** -0.010 ** -0.024  -0.032 ** 0.026 *
(0.013) (0.011) (0.003) (0.045) (0.013) (0.011)
   Log absolute difference in capital and unskilled labor shares between i and j KUDiffij 0.037 *** - -0.005 * - 0.022 ** -
(0.009) - (0.002) - (0.009) -
   Log absolute difference in relative capital-unskilled labor ratios between i and j  KURatioij - -0.143 *** - -0.104  - -0.156 ***
- (0.010) - (0.117) - (0.010)
   Log similarity of i's and j's skilled labor endowment shares Ssimij 0.199 *** 0.235 *** -0.013 ** 0.147  0.120 *** 0.240 ***
(0.022) (0.017) (0.007) (0.157) (0.022) (0.017)
   Log distance of i and j to the rest of the world REMOTEij -0.080  1.036 *** -0.272 *** 0.096   -0.368 *** 1.005 ***
(0.138) (0.121) (0.044) (0.322) (0.137) (0.122)
   PTA between i and j 0.758 *** 0.765 ***          -
(0.094) (0.102)          -
   BIT between i and j -3.832         -          -
5.997         -          -
   Constant -6.819 -8.264 *** 0.897 *** -2.742  -4.668 *** -8.036 ***
(1.089) (0.939) (0.294) (1.925) (1.056) (0.938)
Observations
Countries
Correlation between disturbances in BITs and RTA processes
Standard error of correlation coefficient above
Log-likelihood of model
Log-likelihood of constant-only model
McFadden pseudo-R
2 (in Model 7); R2 (in Models 8 and 9)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 







Model 7 (Bivariate Probit) Model 8 (3SLS; Linear) Model 9 (Recursive)
11325 11325 11325Table 6 - Impact of One-Standard-Deviation Change in the Determinants of BITs and PTAs on Marginal and Conditional Response Probabilities
(Parameters are based on Model 6 in Table 4)
Determinants Acronym BITs PTAs
Log sum of i's and j's real GDP GDPSumij 0 102 *** 0 077 *** 0 101 *** 0 059 ***
BITs|PTA=1 PTAs|BIT=1
Conditional responses Uncond. responses
   Log sum of is and js real GDP GDPSumij 0.102 0.077 0.101 0.059
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
   Log similarity of i's and j's real GDP GDPSimij 0.000 0.007 ** -0.001 0.010 **
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
   Log bilateral distance between i's and j's economic centers DISTij -0.058 *** -0.105 *** -0.080 *** -0.151 ***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
   Adjacency indicator between i and j ADJij -0.005 * 0.004 -0.013 * 0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
   Common official language indicator between i and j LANGij -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
   Political stability between i and j PolStabij 0.032 *** -0.023 *** 0.043 *** -0.029 ***    Political stability between i and j PolStabij 0.032 0.023 0.043 0.029
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
   Inverse expropriation risk between i and j IExpRiskij -0.007 * 0.009 ** -0.009 ** 0.011 **
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
   Log absolute difference in capital and unskilled labor shares between i and j KUDiffij 0.012 *** 0.013 ***
(0.003) (0.004) () ()
   Log absolute difference in relative capital-unskilled labor ratios between i and j KURatioij -0.051 *** -0.059 ***
(0.004) (0.004)
   Log similarity of i's and j's skilled labor endowment shares Ssimij 0.031 *** 0.055 *** 0.024 *** 0.064 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
   Log distance of i and j to the rest of the world REMOTEij -0.002 0.032 *** -0.007 0.044 *** j
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses.Table 7 - Predicting Agreements and Non-Agreements using Specification 6
Statistic (predictions) in % of true events 0.5 E(BIT); E(PTA)
   BITs if BIT=1 17 85
   No BITs if BIT=0 85 62
   Correct BIT successes and failures 77 65
   PTAs if PTA=1 29 75
   No PTAs if PTA=0 84 65
   Correct PTA successes and failures 76 67
Chosen cutoff of
predicted probabilities